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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-4042
_____________
TYRONE MOORE
v.
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
SUPERINTENDENT GRATEFORD SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellants
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-05-cv-00828)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 7, 2015
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 22, 2016)
________________
OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the District Court’s order granting
habeas corpus relief to Tyrone Moore. The Commonwealth argues that such relief is
unwarranted because Moore did not present evidence that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to cross-examine adequately the prosecution’s central witness, Moore’s codefendant Ricardo Scott, and for failing to investigate or present adequately an
exculpatory defense witness, Moore’s co-defendant Anthony Brad Jones. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I.
On October 1, 1982, an armed robbery at the Forty-Fort Animal Hospital in
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, resulted in the death of Nicholas Romanchick. During
the robbery, as the two armed robbers were tying up the four victims (Mr. Romanchick,
his wife Karen Romanchick, and two others), one of the robbers shot Mr. Romanchick.
The robbers fled, and Mr. Romanchick died 13 days later from the gunshot wound.
Law enforcement believed that the Forty-Fort robbery was related to an armed
bank robbery in Chinchilla, Pennsylvania. Surveillance photographs from the Chinchilla
robbery led law enforcement to identify four suspects: Kenneth McGoy, Anthony Brad
Jones, Ricardo Scott, and Tyrone Moore. In the course of law enforcement’s
investigation, Scott confessed to the FBI that he, Moore, and Jones had driven to the
Forty-Fort Animal Hospital to commit the robbery, and that Moore shot Mr.
Romanchick. None of the robbery victims saw Moore fire the fatal shot, and Ms.
Romanchick identified Moore as the shooter in testimony we previously described as
“shaky.” Moore v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 457 F. App’x 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2012).
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Moore was then arrested in connection with the Forty-Fort robbery and Mr.
Romanchick’s murder.
At Moore’s second trial,1 although other witnesses testified that Moore
participated in the Fort-Fort robbery, Scott was the only co-defendant to testify against
Moore. Scott testified that he had given his gun to Moore just before Moore shot Mr.
Romanchick. Scott testified against Moore pursuant to a plea agreement and received
numerous benefits in exchange for his testimony. Moore’s counsel, Joseph Yeager and
Patrick Flannery, did not cross-examine Scott about those benefits or his plea agreement.
Moore presented an alibi defense. He and McGoy testified that Moore was not
with Scott on the night of the Forty-Fort robbery. During Moore’s trial, his counsel had
Jones brought to the courthouse, but spoke with Jones for no more than ten minutes and
then did not call Jones as a witness. Moore’s counsel did not interview or investigate
Jones’s usefulness as a defense witness at any other time. After Moore’s trial, Jones
repeatedly and consistently testified that someone other than Moore committed the FortyFort robbery with Scott.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Moore was
sentenced to death. In post-trial motions and on direct appeal, Moore argued that trial
counsel was ineffective for various reasons, including: (1) failing to cross-examine
adequately Scott about the benefits he received in exchange for his testimony against
Moore; (2) failing to investigate adequately potential alibi witnesses, including Jones; and

1

The first resulted in a mistrial for reasons unrelated to this appeal.
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(3) failing to introduce any mitigation evidence in the penalty phase. The Pennsylvania
courts rejected those arguments. Commonwealth v. Moore, 633 A.2d 1119 (1993).
Moore then filed for relief pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), raising the same arguments that he raised on direct appeal. The PCRA court
held that Moore’s counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce any mitigation evidence
in the penalty phase and vacated Moore’s death sentence. The PCRA court rejected
Moore’s remaining claims, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the
PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Moore, 860 A.2d 88 (2004). On remand, Moore was resentenced to life imprisonment.
Later, Moore petitioned for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In his petition, Moore again
argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, (1) failing to crossexamine Scott adequately about the benefits he received in exchange for his testimony
and (2) failing to investigate adequately potential alibi witnesses, including Jones. The
District Court denied relief. Moore v. Beard, Civ. A. No. 1:05-CV-0828, 2007 WL
4370900 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2007).
Moore appealed and we reversed. We explained that his representation at trial was
deficient because counsel failed to impeach Scott based on his deal with the prosecution.
Moore, 457 F. App’x at 182 (“Scott was one of three key witnesses in the case, and
therefore reasonable counsel would have fully undermined his credibility by introducing
the reduction of his prison exposure from 60 to 20 years and the reduced charge from
first- to third-degree murder.”). We also concluded that Moore received ineffective
4

assistance because his counsel failed to investigate or present Jones as an exculpatory
witness. Id. (“Jones’s affidavit indicates that he would have testified that Emmet Burgis,
and not Moore, was the shooter at the Forty-Fort robbery, which would have directly
contradicted the prosecution’s key witnesses.”). Noting also that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court used the wrong standard to determine whether counsel’s unreasonable
representation prejudiced Moore, we held that “the state court’s rejection of Moore’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was contrary to and an unreasonable application of
Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)], and Moore’s allegations make out a
prima facie case entitling him to habeas relief.” Id. at 183 (internal citations omitted).
We remanded the case to the District Court “to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
Moore’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for which he has demonstrated a
prima facie case for habeas relief.” Id.
At the evidentiary hearing, the District Court heard evidence about whether there
could have been a strategic reason for not fully impeaching Scott or not thoroughly
interviewing Jones. No witness could think of any reason for not cross-examining Scott
about the benefits he received in exchange for his testimony against Moore; and Yeager
admitted that Jones’s testimony would have been helpful, but counsel did not
meaningfully investigate Jones during their brief meeting.2 The District Court concluded
that counsel’s failure to impeach Scott and to interview Jones thoroughly entitled Moore
to habeas relief. This appeal followed.

Flannery had no independent recollection of Moore’s trial, and Jones died before the
evidentiary hearing took place.
2
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II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(a). Our review over the
District Court’s legal conclusions is de novo, but we review its factual conclusions under
a clearly erroneous standard. See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2002).
III.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, Moore must prove
“(1) that his trial counsel’s performance was ‘deficient, that is, it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) ‘that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced’
him, i.e., that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Glenn v. Wynder, 743
F.3d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir.
2007)). Moore must also “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action[s] might be considered sound trial strategy.” Berryman v. Morton, 100
F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Whether “counsel had a trial strategy” is a finding of fact that will not be disturbed unless
it is clearly erroneous, but “whether counsel’s strategy was reasonable” is a question of
law that is reviewed de novo. Id.
The Commonwealth argues that there was no evidence before the District Court to
support a finding that Moore’s trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to crossexamine Scott adequately about the benefits he received in exchange for his testimony
and (2) failing to investigate and present adequately Jones as an exculpatory witness.
More specifically, the Commonwealth argues that Moore failed to present evidence to
6

overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was reasonable. See
Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). It contends that the District Court was
“unable to reconstruct, beyond pure speculation, any logical rationale for many of
defense counsel’s decisions during trial,” (Addendum to App. 3,) leaving the record
without support for a finding that Moore’s counsel were ineffective.
We disagree. There was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the District Court to find
that Moore’s counsel acted unreasonably and that their deficient performance prejudiced
Moore.3
With respect to counsel’s failure to impeach Scott adequately, Yeager testified that
it would have been helpful and consistent with Moore’s trial strategy to cross-examine
Scott about the benefits he received in exchange for testifying against Moore. (App. 4546.) Neither Moore’s trial counsel nor the prosecuting attorney could imagine a trial
strategy that would have been furthered by omitting such cross-examination. In the face
of Yeager’s testimony that impeaching Scott would have furthered Moore’s cause at trial,
and in the absence of any evidence to suggest there was a strategic reason not to impeach
Scott in that manner, the evidence in the record before the District Court was sufficient to
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 282 (3d Cir. 2001). Although
Yeager was not the attorney who actually cross-examined Scott, we decline to rule, as the

3

Because we affirm the District Court, we need not address the additional grounds for
habeas relief advanced by Moore on appeal.
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Commonwealth urges, that Moore cannot meet his burden simply because the attorney
who cross-examined Scott no longer recalls what happened at trial.
With respect to Jones’s potential exculpatory testimony, Yeager testified that he
and Flannery were “wrong” not to interview Jones thoroughly. (App. 65-66.) Although
there is no evidence that Jones made any exculpatory statements during his brief meeting
with Moore’s counsel or at any other time before or during Moore’s trial, Jones
consistently affirmed in his later statements that Moore was not involved in the FortyFort robbery. Hence counsel is deficient where, as here, they did not fully investigate a
witness that they knew may be exculpatory. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691
(“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”). We give due deference to
the need to “guard against the temptation to engage in hindsight,” Marshall v. Hendricks,
307 F.3d 36, 85 (3d Cir. 2002), but in light of counsel’s admission that it was “wrong”
not to investigate further Jones’s usefulness as an exculpatory witness, and in the absence
of any evidence to suggest that the decision not to interview Jones thoroughly supported
any sound trial strategy, the District Court did not err in finding that counsel’s
performance was deficient.
As for the second prong of Strickland, the Court also did not err when it concluded
that counsel’s deficient performance at trial prejudiced Moore. First, Scott was a critical
witness for the prosecution. He was the sole co-defendant to testify against Moore and he
provided many details about Moore’s alleged involvement in the robbery—including his
testimony that Moore was in possession of both guns when Mr. Romanchick was shot—
8

that were otherwise not in evidence. By impeaching Scott with strong evidence of his
motive to testify for the prosecution, Moore’s counsel would have largely neutralized his
testimony and prevented it from bolstering the prosecution’s other evidence. Second, if
Moore’s counsel had thoroughly interviewed Jones and then presented him as an
exculpatory witness, Jones’s testimony would have been critical to Moore’s case. As the
District Court correctly explained, Jones’s testimony would have contradicted Scott’s
account of the Forty-Fort robbery and would have supported Moore’s version of events.
When counsel’s failures are viewed together, they create “a reasonable probability that,
but for [their] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
*

*

*

*

*

We have considered the Commonwealth’s remaining arguments and find them
unpersuasive. The District Court properly concluded that Moore’s counsel was
ineffective and that their deficient representation prejudiced Moore. Thus we affirm.
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment reached by my colleagues, but write separately to note
my disagreement with a prior decision by a panel of our Court. See Moore v. Sec’y Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 457 F. App’x 170 (3d Cir. 2012). The panel in Moore failed to give
proper deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) and ordered an evidentiary hearing that was not permitted under federal law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Morris v. Beard, 633 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2011); Palmer v.
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 391–93 (3d Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the law of the case
doctrine requires me to follow our prior panel’s decision and review this case accepting
the procedural posture in which it arises. See In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717
(3d Cir. 1998). For that reason, I concur in the judgment only.
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